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Archival Foreclosure: A Scholar’s
Lawsuit Against the Estate of
James Joyce
Robert E. Spoo

Abstract

The increasing scope and duration of copyright protection have had a noticeable impact on
archive-based scholarship. More than a few literary estates have hampered scholars’ efforts to
quote from important documents freely accessible to the public in libraries but not fully
usable in published scholarship due to copyright restraints. This paper tells the story of one
scholar who fought back by suing the Estate of James Joyce for a judicial declaration that what
she planned to do with archival materials was fair use and what the Joyce Estate had been
doing to interfere with scholarship was copyright misuse.

S

ome may view administrative fees or other exactions that libraries and
archives demand for scholarly use of the materials they hold physically
hostage as a sort of ransom. Despite this colorful, tongue-in-cheek
kidnap metaphor, I have not found this issue particularly troublesome. In my
experience, scholars and clients do not encounter extortion by the holders
of the physical documents. Rather they face extortion or even downright
foreclosure by the holders of the intellectual property embodied in those
documents—particularly when authors born in the latter part of the nineteenth century or later created the documents, which, therefore, are still
potentially protected by copyright.
We witnessed this problem in an acute form in the lawsuit brought by
J. D. Salinger against his biographer, Ian Hamilton, and Random House in the
1980s—a case that struck fear in the hearts of many scholars and publishers.
There, recipients of unpublished letters from Salinger, or their representatives,
This essay is an elaboration of remarks prepared for the panel entitled “Archival Extortion” at the 2007
Annual Meeting of the Society of American Archivists. The panel examined the limits of physical and
copyright ownership. The phrase “archival extortion” does not exactly capture the problem that I will
discuss here. Additional material may be found in Robert Spoo, “Litigating the Right to Be a Scholar,”
forthcoming in Joyce Studies Annual (2008).
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had donated the letters to university libraries. Neither the recipients nor the
libraries were the obstacle (though the libraries’ permission forms were a minor
issue in the case).1 Instead, Salinger, the holder of the intangible property rights
in the letters, sued the biographer and the publisher, and wielded the blunt
instrument of copyright to protect his privacy. Hamilton tried to avoid infringement through paraphrase but found that, as a conscientious and sensitive
literary biographer, he could not entirely forgo his subject’s rich epistolary
expression. After a fair-use victory in the trial court, the court of appeals reversed
and held that Hamilton had infringed Salinger’s copyright.
That is the chilling paradigm case: a scholar’s need to quote from important
documents freely accessible to the public but not fully usable in published scholarship. Changes in the copyright law, here and abroad, have contributed to the
aggressiveness of copyright owners. The expansion of copyrights, both in scope
and duration, leads many to question whether this law, which plays such an
important role in our culture, has become a victim of its own unprecedented
growth. When a room becomes very crowded, we move instinctively toward the
nearest open window. Copyright crowding has led to greater reliance on fair
use—demonized by some as the “other” of copyright,2 when in fact it serves
exactly the same purposes—and to the rise of a new legal defense, “copyright
misuse,” which takes misbehaving copyright holders to task for trying to extend
a limited monopoly beyond its legal bounds.
Both fair use and copyright misuse were centerpieces of the lawsuit brought
in 2006 by Professor Carol Loeb Shloss of Stanford University against the Estate
of James Joyce. Like Ian Hamilton, Professor Shloss spent years researching her
subject—the sparsely documented life of James Joyce’s troubled daughter,
Lucia—only to be told by James Joyce’s grandson, Stephen James Joyce, that she
was forbidden to quote anything by Lucia, her father, or any other Joyce family
member. Nearly all of the documents that the Joyce Estate declared off-limits to
Professor Shloss and other scholars are either already published or held in
collections generally open to the public. These documents are not “private” in

1

See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).

2

Sometimes, content owners reject the concept of fair use entirely. The late Jack Valenti, president of
the Motion Picture Association of America, was asked during an interview, “Do consumers have a fair
use right to remix a few seconds of a Hollywood movie into a home movie project?” Valenti replied:
“There is no fair use to take something that doesn’t belong to you. That’s not fair use. If you’re a
professor in a classroom, you show ‘Singing in the Rain’ to your class. You can fast forward it, and there’s
no performance fee for that. That’s fair use. Now, fair use is not in the law. People are taking fair use
and changing it to unfair use and claiming that it’s fair use.” J. D. Lasica, “The Engadget Interview:
Jack Valenti” (30 August 2004), available at http://www.engadget.com/2004/08/30/the-engadgetinterview-jack-valenti/, accessed 6 October 2007. If Valenti was quoted accurately, he was very confused
about fair use. Not only does fair use most definitely exist “in the law” (see Section 107 of the U.S.
Copyright Act—17 U.S.C. § 107), but the type of classroom use he describes in the interview is permitted by a provision entirely separate from the fair-use provision: Section 110 (Exemption of Certain
Performances and Displays).
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the sense that they are physically or legally inaccessible. Scholars can learn any of
their secrets; they just can’t safely quote their findings in articles and books or on
the Internet. They can kiss but not tell. And their silence is enforced through
the climate of fear that many copyright holders have cultivated over the past two
or three decades—decades during which it has been brought home, as never
before, how “propertized” the still-copyrighted field of modernism really is.3
Professor Shloss finally published her biography, Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the
Wake, with Farrar Straus & Giroux in 2003, but not before she and her publisher
cut numerous quotations after receiving threats from the estate. In an attempt
to offer an uncut version, Professor Shloss informed the Joyce Estate in 2005 that
she planned to launch a website containing material removed from the book.
The estate replied, predictably, that this would constitute copyright infringement, and forbade the project. Professor Shloss then engaged my legal services
and those of the Stanford Center for Internet and Society and filed a lawsuit
against the estate.
I will touch briefly on the following topics: facts, courage, the lawsuit, its
settlement, and the most recent development in the case, attorneys’ fees.

Facts

A worthwhile lawsuit requires worthy facts. Not every unfairness can be
redressed by the legal system. As a plaintiff, Professor Shloss brought worthy,
litigable facts to her case. For years, her research on Lucia Joyce had been
hampered by opposition from the Joyce Estate. After all, she chose a subject
consistently at the heart of the estate’s demand for privacy—a strange sort of
demand, it must be said, made on behalf of deceased persons, concerning documents residing in public archives, and to be enforced through the ill-fitting
machinery of copyright law. The estate’s opposition first took the form of
assertive letters sent to Professor Shloss, her publisher, her publisher’s president,
her publisher’s lawyer, her university’s provost, and, finally, to her Stanford
lawyers after she expressed the intention of publishing a website that would contain materials that she and her publisher had cut from her Lucia book following
the estate’s threats.4 These letters became important evidence in the lawsuit. The
letter-writing and other conduct alleged in Professor Shloss’s Complaint—
including allegations that the estate or its intermediaries had attempted to interfere with her physical access to certain archival materials and to prohibit her from
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3

Paul K. Saint-Amour describes modernism as “that which is still propertized.” Paul K. Saint-Amour,
review of The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, by William M. Landes and Richard Posner,
Modernism/modernity 12 (2005): 511.

4

See Professor Shloss’s Amended Complaint against Seán Sweeney and the Estate of James Joyce, ¶¶
15–16, 47–63, 79–84, at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Amended+Complaint+Final%
5B1%5D.doc, accessed 6 October 2007.
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quoting from Lucia Joyce’s medical records, over which the estate holds no
copyright5—these allegations and others formed the bedrock factual contentions
in the case. Of course, the price of having a factually rich case is having to
undergo the facts in the first place. This takes me to my second topic.

Courage

Some lawsuits—such as those brought to remedy the infliction of physical
or psychological pain—permit a monetary recovery for what lawyers call “pain
and suffering.” It’s an odd sort of remedy: pain soothed by cash. But a copyright
claimant cannot recover for pain and suffering; nor can a plaintiff like Professor
Shloss, who simply sought an injunction to prevent future pain and a declaration
that she had a right to be the kind of scholar that she had been trained to be. In
fact, Professor Shloss might have added allegations of tortious interference with
contract or intentional infliction of emotional distress, but she chose not to do
so. This case was not about monetary compensation. Yet, in a real and unavoidable way, it was about pain and suffering, and Professor Shloss was required to
revisit many painful experiences, first with her lawyers so that we could help
build her case, and later in the funhouse mirror of her opponents’ arguments.
Professor Shloss has shown great courage throughout the lawsuit. Being a
litigant is not easy, even if you are doing something as seemingly straightforward
as asking the court for a declaration of fair use. Attorneys’ fees aside, the emotional costs of a lawsuit are high; on either side of the “v.,” plaintiff and defendant suffer psychological strain and know that a smart adversary is working hard
to make their position appear threadbare before a tribunal. In this case, the
estate was not content to try to show that Professor Shloss’s legal contentions
were wrong; it launched attacks on her qualities as a scholar and the motivations
of her lawsuit. It asserted in court papers that her lawyers were seeking “to air
their views and test their theories in a public forum.”6 One of the estate’s
lawyers—from the large, prestigious firm of Jones Day—even spent two days at
the Harry Ransom Center studying a Lucia Joyce manuscript for the purpose of
creating a lengthy motion exhibit analyzing Professor Shloss’s transcriptions of
the document.7 All of this was tough on our client, and my hat has been off to
her since she took the step of suing.

5

See Shloss Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 48, 53.

6

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Strike, Carol Loeb Shloss’s Amended
Complaint, 20.

7

Declaration of Anna E. Raimer in Support of Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative to Strike, Carol Loeb Shloss’s Amended Complaint, 1, Exhibit B.
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The Lawsuit

Professor Shloss’s Complaint, which named the Joyce Estate and its trustee
Seán Sweeney as defendants, was filed close to 16 June (what Joyceans call
“Bloomsday”) 2006 in the federal court for the Northern District of California.8
Many learned of it from a New Yorker article about Stephen James Joyce by D. T.
Max.9 The lawsuit sought, among other things, a judicial declaration concerning fair use, copyright misuse, and the U.S. public-domain status of the 1922 first
edition of Ulysses. The proposed website containing materials cut from Professor
Shloss’s book was to be confined to U.S. Internet addresses, so that it could be
downloaded only in this country. We made that decision because a U.S. court
would be reluctant to entertain the case under multiple bodies of national law
with which the court was not familiar—British fair dealing, for example—or to
issue orders that would not necessarily be recognized by foreign courts.
A cutting-edge contention of Professor Shloss’s lawsuit was that the Joyce
Estate was guilty of having engaged in copyright misuse—an attempt to extend its
monopoly power beyond its proper economic sphere by using copyrights to shut
down scholarly discussion, prevent use of public-domain materials, and interfere
with Professor Shloss’s access to physical documents in libraries and archives. If
Professor Shloss could prove copyright misuse, the estate might be disabled from
enforcing its copyrights against her, at least until the estate had purged the
misconduct and its effects.10
Once the estate had secured representation by the Los Angeles office of
Jones Day, we engaged with them in a lengthy discussion of preliminary issues:
personal jurisdiction over the estate and Mr. Sweeney, scheduling, possible settlement, and so on. In November 2006, the estate first made a significant move
by filing a motion to dismiss Professor Shloss’s lawsuit in its entirety. In addition,
the estate alternatively moved, in the event the action was not dismissed, to have
certain allegations and claims stricken from Professor Shloss’s Complaint. The
estate was particularly eager to strike allegations that it had engaged in copyright
misuse and that the 1922 Ulysses is in the public domain in the United States.
The estate’s motion asserted that Professor Shloss had no real and reasonable
fear, then or ever, of being sued by the Joyce Estate for copyright infringement. As
strange as that sounded to those who knew anything of the facts, we had to treat
8

The Complaint was docketed as case number CV 06-3718.

9

D. T. Max, “The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?,” The New
Yorker 82, 19 June 2006, 34–43.

10
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Copyright misuse is discussed and adjudicated in an increasing number of judicial decisions. See, for
example, Intel Corp. & Dell Inc. v. Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organization, 455 F.3d
1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Assessment Technologies of Wisconsin, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640,
647 (7th Cir. 2003); Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Association, 121 F.3d 516,
520 (9th Cir.1997); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
The doctrine of copyright misuse is analyzed in William F. Patry and Richard A. Posner, “Fair Use and
Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred,” California Law Review 92 (2004): 1658–59.
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the argument as a serious one, because federal law does not permit a United States
court to entertain a lawsuit unless a genuine, concrete dispute exists between
the parties. If it turned out that Professor Shloss had never had a reasonable
apprehension of suit, the court would not have the power to go on refereeing a
hypothetical controversy.
We responded with opposition papers that placed before the court, along
with other evidence, numerous letters that Stephen James Joyce had written targeting Professor Shloss’s book project, including letters to her publisher
announcing that the estate was “willing to take any necessary action” to enforce
its copyrights; that the estate’s “record in legal terms is crystal clear” and that it
was “prepared to put [its] money where [its] mouth is”; that the Shloss book
would be published at “your risk and peril” [à vos risques et périls] and that “there
are more ways than one to skin a cat.”11
In a nineteen-page order, Judge James Ware denied the estate’s motion
to dismiss, holding that these communications from the estate, as alleged,
“occurred regularly over a period of nine years, from 1996 to 2005, and easily
left [Shloss] with a reasonable apprehension of copyright liability when she
filed this suit in 2006.”12 The court pointedly remarked that “[t]his case is not a
mere “ ‘academic’ war” or a “ ‘hypothetical’ case,” as [the estate asserts].”13 The
court also refused to dismiss or strike Professor Shloss’s copyright misuse claim,
holding that “[the estate’s] alleged actions significantly undermined the
copyright policy of ‘promoting invention and creative expression,’ as [Shloss] was
allegedly intimidated from using (1) non-copyrightable fact works such as medical records and (2) works to which [the estate] did not own or control copyrights,
such as letters written by third parties.”14 Professor Shloss had also properly
alleged, Judge Ware said, copyright misuse “based on [the estate’s] actions
vis-a-vis third parties,” a ruling that permitted Professor Shloss’s allegations about
the estate’s treatment of other Joyce scholars to remain in the case.15 Having denied
the estate’s motion to dismiss, the court rejected all of the estate’s motion to strike
except as to one paragraph of Professor Shloss’s Complaint containing certain
background allegations. Professor Shloss had defeated 99 percent of the estate’s
combined motions. This set the stage for settlement.
11

These statements by Mr. Joyce appear in his letter to Professor Shloss, dated 8 August 2003, and his
letter to Leon Friedman, an attorney for Farrar Straus and Giroux, dated 21 November 2002. These
letters and others by Mr. Joyce were included in their entirety with Professor Shloss’s Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Strike. The
Opposition, which quotes from the letters in the context of factual and legal argument, may be found
at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Shloss+Brief+FINAL.pdf., accessed 6 October 2007.

12

Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

13

Shloss v. Sweeney, at 1079.

14
15

Shloss v. Sweeney, at 1080.
Shloss v. Sweeney, at 1081.
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Settlement

Professor Shloss never wished to settle her lawsuit; the estate’s actions in the
case triggered settlement. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the estate’s
lawyers stated in open court that the estate was considering filing a “covenant
not to sue” Professor Shloss for any of the material contained in her website.16
Later, the estate made this intention even clearer. A covenant is a formal, binding promise. If the estate had filed such a promise with the court, Judge Ware
would have had little choice but to dismiss the case upon the estate’s motion,
because a federal court, once again, is constitutionally forbidden to entertain a
lawsuit where a genuine dispute no longer exists between the parties.
A covenant would have rendered the case moot because it would have given
Professor Shloss all the practical relief she had sued for. The question then
became, what more could she obtain if she accepted dismissal after settlement
than if she waited for dismissal after a covenant? The answer can be found in
the public settlement agreement: not only can Professor Shloss publish her
website,17 but she can also reproduce it in print form within the United States—
something she did not ask for in her Complaint.18
Some were puzzled that this case did not go to a final judgment and create
a legal precedent for other scholars and copyright users. Chalk it up to the
estate’s choice not to litigate the case any further. It is true that the lawsuit has
not generated a major public legal decision like Judge John M. Woolsey’s
famous opinion in United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses.19 But even precedent
has its limits. Judge Woolsey’s opinion was the law only of the Southern District
of New York, strictly speaking. Even after it was affirmed by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals,20 its writ ran only to the federal districts of New York,
Connecticut, and Vermont. Yet the Woolsey opinion shows that a case can have
symbolic resonance and practical consequences far beyond its official reach. A
just lawsuit can arouse public indignation against a misuse of law or power, and
can offer the edifying example of an individual standing up to that misuse. It
can also make a point about the costs of behaving badly. Much of our social
order functions without the formal interventions of law.21 A Texas publisher in
16
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At the hearing, the attorney for the Joyce Estate stated: “Your Honor, certainly negotiating a covenant
is something that the Estate has considered. . . . [I]t doesn’t seem that the Estate should have to give
that covenant. That doesn’t mean it won’t.” Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable James
Ware, 31 January 2007, 17.

17

Found at http://www.lucia-the-authors-cut.info/, accessed 24 June 2008.

18

A copy of the Settlement Agreement, signed by the parties on 16 and 19 March 2007, may be found at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Shloss+Settlement+Agreement.pdf, accessed 6 October 2007.

19

5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). The Shloss case has, however, produced potentially significant published precedent on copyright misuse and attorneys’ fees, as discussed herein.

20

United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).

21

See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1991).
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1935, though lacking the official protection of the Woolsey decision, might have
drawn inspiration and courage from that case to issue a progressive new novel.
A publisher today might find in Professor Shloss’s case the message that scholarly fair use is real and vital enough for at least one academic and her attorneys
to have cared enough to go to law over it. A lawsuit as right and resonant as Shloss
v. Estate of James Joyce may have a long career of practical, if not legal, authority.

Attorneys’ Fees

The nature of Professor Shloss’s settlement—a court-approved and courtenforceable settlement giving her all the practical relief she sought, and more—
permitted her, we thought, to ask the court to order the Joyce Estate to pay her
legal fees. Pro bono assistance can be entitled to compensation if the governing
statute—here, the Copyright Act—permits fees to be awarded to the “prevailing
party.”22 So we moved for fees, and on 30 May 2007, Judge Ware granted our
motion in a five-page opinion, holding that Professor Shloss was the prevailing
party because “by the Settlement Agreement, [she] achieved a material, judicially
sanctioned alteration in the parties’ legal relationship.”23 The court explained that
[Shloss] secured via Settlement Agreement the essence of the relief she had
sought: the ability to publish the Electronic Supplement online for access within
the United States, without threat of suit from [the estate]. Moreover, [Shloss]
secured further relief not even requested in her First Amended Complaint: that
is, the ability to publish her Electronic Supplement in print format, without fear
of suit from [the estate]. In return, [Shloss] agreed only to dismiss her claims
with prejudice; she did not agree to pay [the estate] money or to limit her conduct. [The estate’s] contention that they are the “prevailing party” because
[Shloss] agreed to dismiss her claims with prejudice is untenable.24

What does this order do? It tells us in no uncertain terms that Carol Shloss
“prevailed” on the basis of the results she obtained. Is it precedent on questions
of fair use and copyright misuse? No. Is it precedent on the attorneys’ fees issue?
Yes, the opinion has been officially published in an official legal reporter. Bear
in mind that Judge Ware has ruled on the fact of fees; the parties still have to
litigate the amount of fees.25
We are very pleased with the results of this lawsuit and are proud to have
helped Carol Shloss bring it. It’s not every day that the right thing happens. This
day, it did.
22

See 17 U.S.C. § 505.

23

Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

24

Shloss v. Sweeney, at 1085–86.

25

As of this writing, the court is considering Professor Shloss’s motion for a clarification of certain points
in Judge Ware’s order regarding attorneys’ fees.
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